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8 April 1966

## AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT CRITERIA FOR FURNISHING AID THROUGH THE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

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USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT

(Thesis)

An Assessment of Current Criteria for  
Furnishing Aid Through the US  
Military Assistance Program

by

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8 April 1966

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## SUMMARY

Throughout history military assistance has been an important tool of statecraft. It has been used to cement alliances, to bolster a weaker ally, to develop an ally to the strategic advantage of the stronger state, and to create a dependence upon the donor state thus enhancing the power and prestige of that stronger state in the world political arena.

Acceptance of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 by the US Congress in voting the Greek-Turkish Aid Act, followed successively by the Marshall Plan and Mutual Defense Assistance Act, placed military assistance in a new light. It became an integral part of US foreign policy, and, with other forms of foreign aid, the salvation of the free world in the post-World War II struggle against the pressures of Soviet imperialism and Communist aggression. Notwithstanding its humanitarian aspects, military assistance has contributed to development and furtherance of national strategy. Military assistance has become an extension of US national defense. It has supported a strategy of collective defense by creating strong allies in forward deployments against communism. It has, as was intended by Congress, promoted the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States.

The criteria for determining the recipients and the amount of aid have not been specified in exact terms by law. Rather, the criteria must be viewed in terms of effects--effects that giving assistance will have upon our national objectives and national strategy. Also pertinent to such determinations are the intent of Congress, the record of past accomplishments and knowledge of changes that have occurred, and trends that have emerged since the program's inception.

Examination disclosed that, in spite of inherent weaknesses, the military assistance program has served the best interests of the United States. There is great need for its continued application as a security screen behind which economic and social development can take place to the benefit of the entire free world.

In exchange, should nations be required to give assurances that they will support US policy in its fight against communism? This thesis concludes that such assurances are neither desirable nor necessarily in the US interests. It proposes, however, that no nation be permitted to receive US assistance while receiving Soviet or other Communist support. Further, it recommends that US military assistance be made available to those nations who demonstrate a genuine desire to become a respected member of the world community of free nations, provided that giving such

assistance is, in the final analysis, in the best interests of the United States. The national objectives and strategy must be served.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

On 14 January 1965, in transmitting his recommended Foreign Aid Program for 1966 to the Congress, President Johnson stated, in part:

Military assistance makes it possible for nations to survive. It provides a shield behind which economic and social development can take place. It is vital to our security as well. . .<sup>1</sup>

In those few sentences the President has succinctly expressed the raison d'etre of the U.S. Military Assistance Program, a vital ingredient in the overall aid program and thus an important element of our foreign policy. However, as we shall note, "the foreign aid program is many things to many different Americans. . ."<sup>2</sup> It is also many things to many others.

Every President has, since inception of the current concept of military assistance in 1947, recommended the program for the approval of Congress.<sup>3</sup> The fact that Congress has annually seen fit to provide continuing endorsement of the program by appropriating the necessary implementing funds has had little dampening

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<sup>1</sup>Lyndon B. Johnson, "Foreign Aid," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 52, 1 Feb. 1965, p. 127.

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup>"Military Assistance: Backbone of our Global Alliances," For Commanders, Vol. 1, No. 18, p. 1.

effect upon the volume of criticism heard from those who have consistently opposed the program, either for its very existence or for its method of implementation. The nature and intensity of the criticism varies, depending upon the views and goals of the antagonist. Censure ranges from the honest objections of well-intentioned private citizens, and groups of citizens, who oppose the basic idea of foreign aid, through those who charge that it is nothing more than a hopeless giveaway scheme with little or no chance of success, to the blatant protestations of organized political bodies, domestic and foreign, who see the program for what it is--a powerful force capable of preventing the further spread of communism.

This latter element of opposition, the organized political bodies, challenges the altruistic aspects of military assistance by asserting that it is merely an imperialistic ruse to gain control of weak states for the purpose of exploiting their people and resources. This element further contends that the military assistance program strengthens those states opposed to communism and is counter to the interests of world peace. That it strengthens non-communist governments to resist outside efforts to enslave their people is not argued.

"Our military assistance often has made it possible for these nations to survive."<sup>4</sup> However, the ability of weak states to

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<sup>4</sup>Dean Rusk, "The Foreign Assistance Program," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 50, 13 Apr. 1964, p. 596.



resist communism can hardly be construed as counter to the interests of world peace in terms of the true aspirations of free men.

Accepting this vociferous opposition by the outraged Communists, their front organizations, and their sympathizers, as an unqualified endorsement of our military assistance program, we may turn our attention to constructive criticism. Assuming that even the best plan can be honestly criticized and subsequently improved through scrutiny, further examination is warranted. Hence, we evaluate what may be a valid objection.

An area that has been the cause of widespread concern and thoughtful discussion pertains to reciprocity on the part of the recipient of military assistance. Note that "reciprocity" does not mean "obligation", but rather a mutual dependence or co-operation. Specifically, the question resolves itself to one of assurance of reciprocity. Should assurances be demanded, as a pre-condition to receiving grant aid military assistance,<sup>5</sup> that assisted nations will support the United States in its fight against communism?

It is the purpose of this paper to assess the current criteria for furnishing aid through the Military Assistance Program in light of this question. The assessment will consider the current threat to US national security and US strategic

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<sup>5</sup> See Annex A for definitions of the various kinds of aid connected with a Military Assistance Program.

objectives. An appreciation of the program and its important role as an integral part of US foreign policy will be gained by a brief review of the environment at its origin, its initial objectives, its evolution, and its principal accomplishments and failures. Significant changes in environment and threat will be highlighted. Finally, as a basis for subsequent conclusions and recommendations the current criteria will be assessed focusing particular attention upon the degree of assurances which should be demanded of recipient states. Specifically, should their support of US policy in the fight against communism be required as a pre-condition for assistance?

## CHAPTER 2

### THE EVOLUTION OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Military assistance is not a 20th Century innovation. Throughout history it has been employed by states as a means of bolstering their alliances. The treaties of the 17th and 18th centuries were replete with provisions designed by a major power to increase the military strength of his weaker ally. This traditional form of military aid is simply a division of labor and resources between two states. One supplies the materiel and training while the other supplies the manpower.<sup>1</sup>

This principle was skillfully applied in 1941. To circumvent existing limitations of US neutrality legislation, Lend-Lease (military assistance by another name) was born to make American war materiels available to the Allies.<sup>2</sup> The United States became the "Arsenal of Democracy,"<sup>3</sup> and military assistance was a major factor in the Allied victory.<sup>4</sup>

The defeat of Nazi Germany and her allies left a ravaged and destitute Europe, as well as a power vacuum. It saw an

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<sup>1</sup>Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, Jun. 1962, p. 303.

<sup>2</sup>Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People, p. 998.

<sup>3</sup>Kurt London, The Permanent Crisis, p. 114.

<sup>4</sup>"Military Assistance: Backbone of Our Global Alliances," For Commanders--This Changing World, Vol. 1. No. 18, p. 1.

immediate resurgence of Soviet pressures and widespread Communist activity.<sup>5</sup> In general, in areas that had been occupied by the Axis Powers, the local Communist movements emerged from the war as the strongest, best organized and equipped, and most experienced political action groups in their states. Turkey and Greece soon felt the Soviet pressures and Communist guerrilla activity. The free world entered a period perhaps more critical than the destructive one that had just ended. America, now playing the role of world leader, was shortly to use an old tool, military assistance, in a new way and for a new purpose.

On 12 March 1947, President Truman laid the Greece-Turkey crisis before a special joint session of Congress. He called for American assistance to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."<sup>6</sup> Assistance included economic and financial aid and personnel who would ". . . assist in the tasks of reconstruction. . .".<sup>7</sup> The President further recommended to Congress ". . . that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel."<sup>8</sup> Thus was born a new concept, that of combining military assistance and economic and financial aid for the express purpose of supporting free people to resist communism.

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Harry S. Truman, Message to the Congress on 12 Mar. 1947, The Record of American Diplomacy, p. 726.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 727.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

The President's proposed program, and conceptual statement which was to become known as the "Truman Doctrine", brought mixed reaction. "Americans sensed a radical new departure in foreign policy, and one with perhaps untold implications for the future. . .".<sup>9</sup>

At this same time the menace of the spread of Soviet power hung over an exhausted Western Europe near economic collapse and Communist control.<sup>10</sup> Extension of the new doctrine brought the European Recovery Plan, or Marshall Plan.<sup>11</sup> In 1950, to counter increasing Communist efforts, assistance was extended to some nations of Asia.

In 1949, after introduction of the Marshall Plan in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was organized, followed by the US Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) to provide materiel and equipment to members of the alliance. Seeking an improved foreign aid program, Congress, in 1951, united the economic, and military and technical assistance programs under one law.<sup>12</sup> The Military Assistance Program remains today as an integral element of the overall aid program, administered under this single law concept.

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<sup>9</sup>Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, p. 341.

<sup>10</sup>Summary Presentation to the Congress, Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Programs, FY 1965, Agency for International Development and Department of Defense, Apr. 1964, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup>US Laws, Statutes, etc., Public Law 472.

<sup>12</sup>US Laws, Statutes, etc., Public Law 165.



This brief review of the evolution of military assistance highlights an important development as regards its manner of application. Since World War II military assistance has properly become one element of a single coordinated aid program. There is now an awareness of the interrelationship and mutually supporting aspects of political, economic, social, and military actions in the development of foreign policy. Military assistance has taken its rightful place on this team. Programs designed to promote higher and more adequate levels of social and economic well-being cannot succeed without peace and order, conditions which Communists cannot tolerate if their programs are to succeed. Recognizing this, President Kennedy stated to Congress, ". . . A vital element toward such stability is assurance of military strength sufficient to protect the integrity of these emerging nations while they are advancing. . . ."13

The discussion to follow in this paper will be an examination of the continuing validity of this concept.

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<sup>13</sup>John F. Kennedy, Message to the Congress on 22 Mar. 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 211.

## CHAPTER 3

### CURRENT OBJECTIVES AND CRITERIA

#### GENERAL

The goal of US foreign aid has been stated many times and in a variety of ways. Officially, it is described in the preamble to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (hereafter called "the Act") as:

An Act to promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assisting people of the world in their efforts toward economic development and internal and external security, and for other purposes.<sup>1</sup>

Note that the orientation is actually inward--the aid is designed with the benefit to the United States uppermost in mind. This is proper; the goal of any state is survival. What is important here is the recognition that the security of the United States is clearly diminished when other countries fall under Communist domination. "Foreign assistance, where it operates in the areas menaced by direct Communist aggression, is a straight-forward extension of the national defense program."<sup>2</sup> Our government thus supports a large foreign aid program predicated on the firm belief

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<sup>1</sup>US Laws, Statutes, etc., Public Law 87-195, as amended (hereafter referred to as "The Act").

<sup>2</sup>Summary Presentation to the Congress, Proposed Mutual Defense and Assistance Programs, FY 1964, Agency for International Development and Department of Defense, Apr. 1963, p. 1 (hereafter referred to as "MDAP, FY 64").

that security of the US depends upon the security of free and independent nations.

The Military Assistance Program, as a part of the foreign aid program, is given a specific goal by the Act. In furtherance of the continuing policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations,<sup>3</sup> it is intended that the program "furnish to such countries cooperative military assistance . . . to help them provide for their own security . . . and for the security of international organizations of which they may be members."<sup>4</sup>

In light of these ambitious goals the objectives and criteria must be developed.

### OBJECTIVES

US military strategy since 1945 has always assumed that we would have allies to assist in the common effort. This assumption is a direct reversal of our "go-it-alone policy" in practice prior to Pearl Harbor. It represents not only an appreciation of the vast powers of modern technology and the destructiveness of modern warfare but a maturity on the part of American political thinking. ". . . Our strategy has been based on the concept of

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<sup>3</sup>The Act, Sec. 502.

<sup>4</sup>US Congress, Senate Report No. 612, 87th Congress, 24 Jul. 1961, p. 24.

the collective defense of the Free World. And this means that our own security requires that we have strong allies around the world."<sup>5</sup>

Obtaining these strong allies, in most instances, involves military assistance in some form. The primary objective of the program is broad, as it must be to achieve broad goals. It is: to provide military equipment, training, and related services to the armed forces of allied and friendly nations to strengthen their ability to meet external and internal threats to their independence,<sup>6</sup> and, "in many cases to contribute to the common defense posture which gives substance to collective security."<sup>7</sup>

Achievement of this primary objective brings advantages other than the apparent. A concurrent strengthening of US national defense posture occurs. The level of US forces, strategic objectives, and capabilities of allied forces are interrelated. Thus an increase in allied force capability contributes to the overall defense posture and enhances the success of US contingency operations. Additionally, attainment of the objective enhances US security by helping to guarantee continued access to oversea installations and bases essential to the effective deployment of

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<sup>5</sup>US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1965, pt. 1, p. 299 (hereafter referred to as "Congress, Appropriations, 1965").

<sup>6</sup>MDAP, FY 64, p. 57.

<sup>7</sup>US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY 1964, Pt. 2, p. 60 (hereafter referred to as "Congress, Appropriations, 1964").

US forces.<sup>8</sup> The combination of these oversea bases and combat-effective allies create a vital first line of defense, valuable in terms of both distance and time. Finally, accomplishment contributes to US long-range political objectives through training programs which bring many present and future foreign military leaders to the US.<sup>9</sup> This exposure is of inestimable value, present and future.

#### POLICY DIRECTION

A careful reading of the Act leads one to believe that Congress desires to control rather specifically the manner in which funds are expended, on whom, and for what particular purpose. Such a conclusion is correct, as far as intent. The testimony taken by various Congressional committees are full of exchanges regarding the specifics of funding and nature of elements of the program. Nonetheless, Congress has given the President an inordinate latitude of authority to provide military assistance under the terms of the law. In the opinion of the author a more detailed and guiding authority would benefit the program, not because of any Presidential inability to cope with the sweeping authority but because of the excessive amount of subsequent interrogation by Congressional committees challenging the reasons for decisions and actions.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>MDAP, FY 64, p. 57.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Congress, Appropriations, 1965, passim.



The general authority given to the President by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provides that:

The President is authorized to furnish military assistance on such terms and conditions as he may determine to any country or international organization, the assisting of which the President finds will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace and which is otherwise eligible to receive such assistance. . . .<sup>11</sup>

There are many obvious questions generated by this authority. Except for limitations imposed elsewhere within the law, and those for the most part deal with administration rather than basic eligibility, the President has a free hand as well as an enormous responsibility. There is little restraint other than judgment, and the wrath of Congress which must not be underrated. Subsequent aid and assistance programs, and fund authorizations, owe their lives to the ability of the President to exercise this authority and interpret it wisely.

That military assistance is an integral part of the entire foreign aid program, impacting upon the economic development aid and bearing directly upon our foreign policy, is illustrated by the arrangement for executive direction of the aid program and the military assistance segment. The Secretary of State has overall responsibility for the coordination of both military and economic aid. The Act specifically provides that ". . . the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of the assistance programs. . . ."<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>The Act, Sec. 503.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., Sec. 622 (c).

The absolute necessity that military assistance be complementary as an instrument of foreign policy is further highlighted by a stipulation that the Secretary of State shall be authorized to determine whether there will be a military assistance program for a country and the value of such a program.<sup>13</sup> Hence, once determination is made, the Secretary of Defense assumes primary responsibility for developing and administering the program.<sup>14</sup>

#### CURRENT CRITERIA

Criteria, per se, for the determination of whether assistance is to be provided to a specific nation or international organization is not announced or delineated by the authorizing statute. Neither is the type or amount of aid that should be given spelled out. Rather, it becomes an exercise in derivation, interpretation of intent, and isolating permission by exclusion. The President, and his principal advisors for foreign aid, the Secretaries of State and Defense, are put to task to implement the law, achieve its goals and attain the desired results while, concurrently, insuring that dollar for dollar the program is advantageous to donor and recipient alike. The "climate of Congress", particularly at budget time, is often indicative of the degree of success attained by the decision makers. Of course, always available are the unsolicited views of "Monday morning quarterbacks" in the

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., Sec. 623.

nation's news media. While generally biased they do, nevertheless, have an opinion-forming effect which must be considered by the administrators of foreign aid.

Initially, the terminology of the general authority under which the President functions to authorize military assistance must be studied in the light of the basis of the law. The basis is best expressed in the goal of the Act, as cited earlier in this chapter.<sup>15</sup> That goal seeks to achieve benefits in the areas basically essential to the nation. Even a cursory reading shows that it intends that the Act promote US national objectives. It speaks of "foreign policy, security and general welfare of the United States. . . ."<sup>16</sup> Thus it relates to foreign policy, our nation's course of action toward other nations, national security, all aspects of the general welfare of our people, and the health of our national economy. Of particular significance is the realization that the mere existence of the law makes it an important element of our national strategy.

A brief review of the US foreign policy provides the decision-maker a valuable insight of the long-range goals thus giving him a foundation upon which to base his judgment. The furnishing of military assistance to friendly countries and international organizations contributes directly to realizing two of the five announced goals of US foreign policy,<sup>17</sup> and provides a shield to secure

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid., Preamble.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Dean Rusk, Five Goals of U.S. Foreign Policy, Transcript of Television Program, Department of State and National Educational Television Network, 24 Sep. 1962, pp. 5-6.

achievement of the other three. Military assistance plays a key role in realizing "Security through Strength" and "Peace through Perseverance." It is a shield for achieving "Progress through Partnership," "Revolution of Freedom," and "Community under Law."<sup>18</sup> Analysis of the rationale for establishment of these foreign policy goals is valuable to a decisionmaker in military assistance.

National security, the second national objective derived from the goal of the Act, can embody nearly any aspect of activity, domestic or foreign, which may impinge upon the nation's survival. With the advent of modern tactical and strategical weaponry, and the accompanying breakthroughs in all of the related fields of warfare, national security truly can be viewed in a global context. Further, recognition that security can be attacked successfully by economic, political, financial, social, and psychological means, in addition to the forceful means normally associated with war, opens "Pandora's Box" in the realm of rationale for determination of a requirement for military assistance. In fact, were the final basis traced for having ruled in favor of military assistance when other factors tended to argue against it, in most instances it would be because of its adjudged effect on national security. An excellent example of such determination was the determination by the President in the "interests of national security" to aid Yugoslavia, in spite of the specific prohibition

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

against furnishing assistance to a nation "whose government is based upon the theory of government known as communism. . . ." <sup>19</sup>

The President, of course, had not acted illegally for another provision of the Act <sup>20</sup> gives him the authority to override other considerations in such instances.

It is not the purpose of this paper to minimize the weight that should be given to the element of national security in the derivation of criteria for furnishing military assistance. On the contrary, it should be pointed out that virtually any threat to national security is a threat to all other national objectives. National survival is the keystone of all national objectives for if the life of the nation is jeopardized all that depend upon it for existence are equally threatened. Hence, the latitude permitted the President in developing criteria in the interests of national security is great.

General welfare as a national objective needs little amplification since it is an ambiguous term, albeit meaningful to citizens of a free society. It too has foreign as well as domestic implications, and the latitude permitted in arriving at the decision to furnish assistance is appropriately wide.

The health of the economy is, naturally, of great concern to the Congress. Thus we find a good number of specific directives

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<sup>19</sup>The Act, Sec. 109 (a).

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., Sec. 614 (a).



and prohibitions in the Act, each intended to safeguard or bolster the health of the economy. These directives and prohibitions range from prescribing measures to be followed in purchasing from US small business concerns<sup>21</sup> to outright prohibition against furnishing assistance to any government which has failed to honor a just debt to a US citizen.<sup>22</sup> As in the case of satisfying the interests of the other national objectives, the decision-maker enjoys considerable freedom of action in determining criteria on behalf of the health of the economy. However, in this instance the record indicates that errors have generated immediate Congressional interest and action.

Interpretation of the intent of Congress is somewhat more simple. It is a normal legislative process to require the President to recommend his foreign aid legislation and subsequently defend it. Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives study the proposal, hear witnesses, and prepare recommendations to their respective full bodies. In the course of the committee hearings, floor debates, and subsequent actions to resolve any differences between Senate and House desires, much dialogue is recorded. Committee reports are a fountain of knowledge for a researcher seeking to determine the intent of Congress. Although the desires of individual congressmen or of a particular committee do not always become a part of the formal statute, the

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<sup>21</sup>Ibid., Sec. 602.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., Sec. 620 (c).

wise decisionmaker considers those views when facing difficult determinations of criteria for furnishing military assistance.

Yet another factor warrants consideration in the determination of criteria. The language of the law clearly shows that US foreign aid is a long-range program. Consequently, the application of military assistance for the purposes stated in the Act and the building of strong allies, singly or in regional arrangements, become a vital part of our national strategy. Through our assistance, and in concert with other US policies, allies and international organizations are formed and made viable which become our forward defense. Hence, our national strategy incorporates the elements of collective security and forward deployment of forces. The criteria for furnishing aid must consider effect on this national strategy.

The question being addressed by this paper; i.e. "Should their (assisted nations) support of US policy in the fight against communism be required as a precondition for assistance?" will be answered in part by assessing criteria in terms of their effects upon the factors discussed above. National objectives, national strategy and the intent of Congress will, in the final analysis, be the governing factors. However, prior to arriving at any position there are other valid factors to consider. These will be discussed next.

## CHAPTER 4

### RESULTS, CHANGES, AND TRENDS

#### GENERAL

Normally the success of any program can be measured directly in terms of the results attained. A builder sees a finished house; an engineer sees an end product; a parent points proudly to his healthy, educated young-adult. Americans are frequently chided for measuring success in terms of material progress evidenced by accumulation. While there are instances where that type of yardstick is used, more often than not success is viewed in terms of accomplishment. We take pride in having accomplished our objectives. And Americans are, above all, impatient and anxious to see a task completed.

Measuring the results or degree of success of the military assistance program, unfortunately, is not a simple matter. The subject does not lend itself to a plain black and white analysis. Often it must be measured in negative terms. What did it prevent? How much did it deter a process? Also, it may be expressed in terms of the accomplishments of other programs. How much did it contribute to the success of developmental programs? Could Plan X have succeeded in the absence of a military assistance program? Answers to these questions become one of judgment and are subject to challenge.

Results must also be viewed in the light of changes or trends which have developed during the course of the program. The conditions existent at the outset of the program helped determine the objectives and the methods employed. Since nothing is static, and nothing is as permanent as change itself, we must expect our methods and objectives to accommodate to the changes and adapt to the trends that develop. Our measurements must take these phenomena into account.

This chapter will be devoted to an attempted compilation of the major results, and failures, of the military assistance program, and to an identification of changes that have occurred and trends that have emerged during the course of the program.

## RESULTS

As indicated earlier it is difficult to separate foreign aid into its respective categories. This is particularly true when evaluating the military assistance program. Economic aid and military assistance form a package. A failure of one directly affects the other. Congress recognized this relationship by combining the two programs under one law<sup>1</sup> and insisting on fixing responsibility for coordination in one man, the Secretary of State. However, the following are considered to be successes

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<sup>1</sup>US Laws, Statutes, etc., Public Law 87-195, as amended (hereafter referred to as "The Act").

attributed in large measure to the military assistance program since the close of World War II:

1. Italy and Greece were saved from communism following World War II.<sup>2</sup>
2. Russia was foiled in her attempts to seize control of the Turkish Straits.<sup>3</sup>
3. The Middle East oil fields and Iran were saved from Soviet Union domination.<sup>4</sup>
4. Laos, Cambodia and Nationalist China were saved from Communist aggression.<sup>5</sup>
5. Vietnam would have long since fallen to Communists.<sup>6</sup>
6. NATO would not be an effective force.<sup>7</sup>

A summation of the major failures of the military assistance program should include:

1. Failure to separate long-range objectives from immediate problems with resultant dilution of desired impact of the overall aid program. Korea's slow start on development programs has been cited by Congress as an example.<sup>8</sup>
2. The loss of Cuba to communism.

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<sup>2</sup>US Dept of State, Foreign Aid Facts and Fallacies, Jul. 1961, p. 48 (hereafter referred to as "Foreign Aid Facts").

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>8</sup>US Congress, Senate Report No. 612, 87th Congress, 24 Jul. 1961, pp. 5-6.



3. The apparent loss of Indonesia and Cambodia from Western orientation.
4. Yugoslavia remains Communist.
5. Inability of South Vietnam's armed forces to maintain internal security without assistance by US combat units.

Undoubtedly, there are other equally valid examples of successes and failures. The successes and failures cited above are the "apparent" ones. A further study of the nature of these events will show that they form a larger picture; the military assistance program can be credited with greater accomplishments than these single events would indicate.

Genuinely concerned over the program and intent upon maximizing its effectiveness, President Eisenhower, in November 1958, appointed a number of eminent citizens to conduct an objective analysis of the military assistance aspects of the Mutual Security Program. This committee reported<sup>9</sup> to the President that the program had ". . . played a significant role in deterring a third world war, in preserving the independence of many nations, in furthering our strategy of alliances and oversea bases for forward deployment, and in providing hope for economic progress among the peoples of the less developed countries."<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Composite Report, Washington, 17 Aug. 1959.

<sup>10</sup>Military Assistance: Backbone of Our Global Alliances," For Commanders--This Changing World, Vol. 1, No. 18, p. 4.

Expanding upon the findings of the committee and expressing them in more finite terms we can see some positive accomplishments. Through our military assistance program we succeeded in strengthening our allies, at a very critical time, to withstand Soviet and internal Communist pressures and survive as nations. One need only recall the conditions in which most of the Western European nations found themselves in the early post-World War II period to realize the criticality.

Our assistance provided the vehicle for the creation and subsequent growth of an effective collective defense system. It helped make the strategy of collective defense and forward deployment a reality. It helped make "containment" a living strategy. Secretary of Defense McNamara has said "The great and glowing strength of our NATO allies in that region stands as a monument to the success of our foreign aid programs in the post-World War II."<sup>11</sup>

Finally, we have been able to reduce US manpower requirements while obtaining a strong defense for less cost. A committee appointed by President Kennedy to study the Foreign Aid Program reported that "Dollar for dollar," with particular reference to the free world's area bordering on Communist states, "these programs contribute more to the security of the free world than

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<sup>11</sup>US Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1965, Pt. 1, p. 299.

corresponding expenditures in our defense appropriations. . . ." <sup>12</sup>  
Further, it has been computed that it costs (annually) only a fraction of the amount required to maintain an indigenous soldier: \$163 for a Chinese soldier; \$233 for a Korean; \$400 for a Thai; and \$389 for a Turkish soldier. <sup>13</sup> It has been said that the free world gets nearly ten Allied soldiers for the cost of one US soldier. <sup>14</sup>

### CHANGES

The factors of change important in a subsequent assessment of criteria can be derived several ways. The approach chosen here will be to make certain direct comparisons and to view some specifics of evolutions in policy and practice developed during the course of the military assistance program. Selecting the period 1945-1950 as the base, the changes can be seen.

Of particular significance is the readily apparent change in conditions--political, economic, social, and military. Conditions at the outset of the program varied markedly from current conditions; thus needs and points of emphasis and expediency have also changed.

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<sup>12</sup>The Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, Report to the President of the United States, Washington, 20 Mar. 1963, p. 5.

<sup>13</sup>Foreign Aid Facts, pp. 38-39.

<sup>14</sup>US Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY 1964, Pt. 2, p. 170.

Initially, the "health" of the patient, the direct result of his political-economic-social-military deficiencies, was poor. It is safe to say that many of the patients were desperately ill; a few had been placed on the critical list. To be of value, assistance was needed urgently and in large doses. Military assistance, although a priority item, had to be preceded by economic aid. The "doctor" was placed in the position of providing for the immediate security of his patient until his economic health improved sufficiently to permit him to accept other forms of nourishment, namely military assistance.

It will be recalled that Marshall Plan aid was created for this express purpose. Nearly ninety percent of our total foreign assistance funds were directly to Western Europe and Japan initially.<sup>15</sup> The effects were astounding, and as the military assistance programs came to complement the aid program the forward screen of NATO was built to shield further development and to enhance US national security.

The current conditions of the former patient nations attest in most cases to their present good health. While a few still lack stamina and still require assistance at a reduced level, by and large the noticeable improvement is apparent. Eleven countries

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<sup>15</sup>Summary Presentation to the Congress, Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Programs, FY 1965, Agency for International Development and Department of Defense, Apr. 1964, p. 3.

of the free world, ten of whom once received US assistance, now conduct their own assistance programs.<sup>16</sup> Hence, we can plot the changes, particularly evident in Western Europe and Japan, both by comparison and by citing specific evolutions: initial economic aid, followed soon by military assistance, gave way to a gradual reduction in all forms of aid; this, in turn, supported the development of strong nations capable of becoming partners in administering to the continuing needs of weaker nations of the free world.

Congress was recently informed that survival is still a direct issue only in Southeast Asia, and that elsewhere in Asia our military assistance programs continue to shield the development efforts.<sup>17</sup> Here we see further evolutions of policy and practice which highlight another major change--that in world environment.

There has been a definite change in the environment in which military assistance was initially applied. The recipient nations of Western Europe were for the most part world powers, akin to the United States in nearly all aspects. These nations were experiencing major difficulties rebuilding from war. They were facing economic and political pressures in the form of demands

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>17</sup>Summary Presentation to the Congress, Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Programs, FY 1966, Agency for International Development and Department of Defense, Mar. 1965, p. 1.



and threats of force from a former ally, Soviet Russia. Hungry people, devastated industries, defunct economies, displaced populations, and an air of despair combined to form the perfect breeding grounds for communism. National survival was at stake. Against this backdrop of home conditions these nations as pre-World War II colonial powers were attempting to re-establish their former colonial empires. But the former colonies had acquired a taste for something better and saw that the time was ripe for change. Crises at home prevented the diversion of critical and scarce resources to suppress these drives for independence. Thus, a new environment was created. New states were born that were to become grist for the Communist mill, unless assistance from the free world that conceived them was forthcoming. But many new problems were to arise.

As evidence of the number of new nations that have emerged since the end of World War II compare the membership of the United Nations at its founding in 1945 with its 1965 membership: 51 as compared to 114.<sup>18</sup> Significant to this discussion is an awareness that each of these new nations has a vote that is equal to the vote of its former colonial master. Herein lies a portion of the problem and the basis for the change in environment. Where Western European nations with centuries of experience as developed economies weighed national survival in its true light, these young,

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<sup>18</sup>Lyndon B. Johnson, "Amending the UN Charter," Department of State Foreign Affairs Outline, No. 12, May 1965, p. 2.

underdeveloped nations were prone to let ambition, pride, arrogance, and impatience cloud the issue of national survival. It became the free world's dilemma to make the potential victim of communism see the threat to his very existence, in spite of himself, while simultaneously catering to the whims of his newly acquired status.

In this environment there evolved the aid programs to Southeast Asia, sub-continent Asia, and Africa. The ability of the planners to diagnose the ills, create the desire for assistance, and apply the correct remedies on a timely basis became one of paramount importance to the free world in its attempt to strengthen the forward defenses on the periphery of communism. The successes have been noted earlier, as have been the failures. Thus we can identify the evolutions in policy and practice. In contrast to a climate of desperate need and eagerness for assistance as evidenced in Europe at the outset of the program, a climate of necessity to convince the recipient that he needs assistance, our style, as evidenced in many of the emerging underdeveloped nations of Asia and Africa, arose. Of particular importance is the recognition that aid in this latter time frame leans heavily toward the developmental, with a mix of military assistance. This application of assistance takes cognizance of the vital need to improve the general welfare of the target populations for subversive insurgency.

While our ability to apply the proper mix on a timely basis and with the recipient's full cooperation is currently being tested in Vietnam and Thailand, our ability to save the patient in the cases posed by Indonesia and Cambodia is less than spectacular. Here stand two excellent illustrations of the inherent risks of being condemned while attempting to act in the best interests of the recipients. Here, also, is evidence of the precariousness of attempting to secure favorable support of our own policies as an element of the military assistance program.

#### TRENDS

As changes have developed, so have trends emerged. An appreciation of two important trends enables the planner better to adapt new plans and programs to changing requirements.

A particularly important trend is that which can be termed as "climatic". The climate of opinion of the American people to accept the burden of a foreign aid program on a continuing, apparently unending, basis is changing. There is a trend toward demanding more positive proof of success and a goal that when reached will mean an end to support. Against this feeling it has steadily become more difficult for planners to justify large appropriations. The tenor of questioning of witnesses during congressional hearings has perceptively changed throughout the years. It has taken on a more suspect air; judgements have come under greater scrutiny.

This, of course, is to be expected. The results of the assistance programs which receive the greatest publicity are those of a sensational nature. The burning of a US Flag, wanton destruction of a US embassy or burning of a US Information Agency library receive wide coverage. The better results of the programs are taken for granted and the public hears only of the abuse. "Americans, noting the need for more schools, less unemployment, slum clearance, and . . . have become understandably less and less enthusiastic over voting large sums for foreign aid."<sup>19</sup>

A second trend that warrants a fuller understanding involves the nature of the threat. Although the previous discussion on changes touched upon this aspect, it is, nonetheless, a trend and should be recognized as such. At the outset the recipient countries considered the threat as one of traditional aggression. Military forces were strengthened to deter aggression by the existence of strong defensive forces. This was the type of warfare known so well and experienced so often. It became a matter of building forces to oppose forces, updated to a nuclear age. The success of the program has already been discussed. Soviet imperialism and Communist expansion have been deterred; the threat of traditional aggression has been met.

This is not to say that economic aid was not working concurrently to eradicate conditions vital to the spread of

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<sup>19</sup>US Congress, House, United States Defense Policies in 1964, House Document No. 285, 4 Jun. 1965, p. 79.

communism from within. It was, and the recovery of Europe is a monument to the Marshall Plan. But the primary threat was considered to be a military one, in the traditional sense. The trend thus can be readily identified. The threat has shifted from traditional force to subversive insurgency. A "shadow force" is working to set the stage for wars of national liberation. Military assistance must now be geared to develop forces designed to detect, prevent and defeat insurgent elements before they can become strong. Military assistance more than ever must be coordinated with economic aid. The general welfare of the people and economy of the nation become the prime objectives because the threat has now shifted from external to internal to counter the enemy strategy.



## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS

As indicated in Chapter 3 the criteria for determining whether or not military assistance should be provided are not specified by law; they must be derived. This paper has attempted to identify the basic sources from which to derive. Perhaps the search for sources can now be summarized.

The criteria for furnishing military assistance are the effects--the effects that the granting of such assistance will have on US national objectives and US national strategy. An intelligent determination of these effects will consider fully the intent of Congress and wisely make use of the knowledge gained of past results, of changes that have occurred, and of trends that have developed during the course of the program.

The Military Assistance Program has inherent weaknesses, as does the whole foreign aid program. It has failed on numerous occasions. The US has experienced abuse, and its prestige has suffered, to some degree. However, in balance, the best interests of the United States, its national objectives and strategy, have been served. The successes greatly outweigh the losses.

This conclusion is founded on the important element of time also. At the outset of the program it was obvious to President Truman that time was of the essence, and that to do nothing was to court disaster. To Congress he said, "We must take immediate

and resolute action . . . If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world--and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation."<sup>1</sup> Thus the advantage was with the initiator; the U.S. properly seized it and benefited. As Machiavelli advised: If one waits until they [difficulties] are at hand, the medicine is no longer in time as the malady has become incurable.<sup>2</sup>

The program has, in the main, considered the intent of Congress. In most cases where the President has exercised his authority to grant aid "in the interests of the U.S.," to override other restrictions, history has proved him correct. Although certain groups in Congress have repeatedly sought to incorporate provisions into the Act that would severely limit the granting of military assistance unless exacting political prerequisites were met, regardless of any other overriding factor, those demands have yet to gain sufficient support to see them become law. For the most part, Congress is chiefly interested in insuring that the American tax dollars are spent wisely and that value is received. This is as it should be.

The future value of military assistance, and of foreign aid in general, depends upon the ability to adapt to changes and

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<sup>1</sup>Harry S. Truman, Message to Congress on 12 Mar. 1947, The Record of American Diplomacy, pp. 726-727.

<sup>2</sup>Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 11.

recognize trends. This will, to some extent, require continuing liberalization of criteria, and better methods to detect and eliminate waste in return.

In the current world environment in which emerging nations are faced with two frequently opposing goals, to develop rapidly and to remain independent, the successful ally-to-be must be quick to adapt to the constantly changing conditions. Particularly important is the necessity to recognize the capabilities of the indigenous military forces for nation-building. This was true to a large degree in the United States, especially in opening the West. Frequently this is the only positive potential readily available. Political astuteness must have time to develop and mature behind a screen of national security and economic development.

The complete assurance that the recipient will support all aspects of US policy as a pre-condition for grant military assistance is unrealistic at this time in history. Such assurance would be tantamount to a demand for an alliance as a prerequisite for aid; the recipient may become an outright liability rather than a potential asset. "The important thing is the will of a nation to develop its resources and defend its independence."<sup>4</sup> The Clay Committee took a similar position when it recommended to President Kennedy in regard to nations that do not always

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<sup>4</sup>Grant S. McClellan, ed., U.S. Foreign Aid, p. 141.

agree with US policy: ". . . aid to countries which are avowedly neutral and sometimes critical of us may be in order, so long as their independence is genuine, their overall behavior responsible, and their use of their own resources prudent and purposeful."<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>The Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, Report to the President of the United States, Washington, 20 Mar. 1963, p. 5.

## CHAPTER 6

### RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that the following fundamental features of current policy governing the employment of military assistance as an essential element of foreign aid continue to receive primary emphasis by all planners:

a. US military assistance must be tailored to meet the joint needs of both the US and the recipient nation in terms of their respective national objectives and US national strategy.

b. the stage of development and conditions within the recipient nation must be considered and the program must be adapted to fit the circumstances; and,

c. the objectives of each military assistance program must be viewed in terms of long-range gains in support of US national objectives and strategy.

It is further recommended that, if to US strategic advantage, the US indicate its willingness to assist any "professed" neutral or Communist aligned state at such time as Communist assistance and support are completely withdrawn.

Finally, it is recommended that, except for being assured that a recipient nation is genuine in its desire to assume a responsible role in the world community of free nations, no



assurances that it will support US policy in its fight against  
communism be demanded as a pre-condition for grant assistance.

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## ANNEX A

### DEFINITIONS OF KINDS OF AID CONNECTED WITH A MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Military assistance provides equipment and training for defense on either a grant or credit assistance basis. It also supports civic action programs through which military forces make useful contributions to social and economic development.<sup>1</sup>

Military Assistance Program Grant Aid is military assistance rendered under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, for which the US receives no reimbursement.<sup>2</sup>

Supporting assistance is economic aid provided for security and stability purposes. The bulk of it goes to nations fighting Communist aggression and subversion and whose own resources are insufficient to finance heavy defense and counterinsurgency burdens.<sup>1</sup>

Contingency funds enable the US Government to meet emergency needs and priority requirements not previously seen or quantified.<sup>1</sup>

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